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Immigration, Criminalization, and
Disobedience
ALLEGRA M. MCLEOD*
This symposium essay explores two contending visions
of immigration justice: one focused on expanding procedural rights for immigrants, and a second associated with a
movement of immigrant youth who have come out en masse
as “undocumented and unafraid,” issuing a fundamental
challenge to immigration restrictionism. As immigration enforcement in the United States increasingly relies on criminal prosecution and detention, advocates for reform have increasingly turned to constitutional criminal procedure, seeking greater procedural protections for immigrants. But this
essay argues that this focus on enhanced procedural protections is woefully incomplete as a vision of immigration justice. Although a right to counsel, for example, may provide
comfort and aid to certain vulnerable individuals, such procedural protections are unlikely to change the quasi-criminal character of immigration enforcement or to address the
plight of the millions of people without a path to lawful status. Just as U.S. constitutional criminal procedure failed to
ameliorate the harshness of substantive criminal law, more
robust immigration procedural protections would likely fail
to reorient immigration enforcement in a more humane direction. By contrast, a growing movement of immigrant
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youth offers a more expansive conception of immigration reform. As these immigrant youth lay claim to a “right to remain,” infiltrate immigration detention centers, and crash
the border, they have reshaped our political and legal discourse, gesturing towards an alternative vision of immigration justice.
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III. RE-IMAGINING IMMIGRATION REFORM ..................................581
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INTRODUCTION
There are more than fifty million people worldwide internally
displaced in camps or living as refugees, often in desperate conditions, in squalid tents, dependent on handouts of food, with little or
no access to clean drinking water or health care to prevent outbreaks
of cholera, malaria and other diseases.1 Thousands more die each
year attempting to flee conditions of poverty and violence by sea or
in the desert borderlands that separate the United States from Mexico.2 Of those who succeed in crossing the U.S. border, approximately eleven million live in the United States without lawful immigration status, under the threat of deportation or removal.3 The
United States confines and removes roughly 400,000 of these immigrant men, women, and children each year,4 holding these persons
1
See World Refugee Day: Global Forced Displacement Tops 50 Million for
First Time in Post-World War II Era, UNITED NATIONS REFUGEE AGENCY (June
20, 2014), http://www.unhcr.org/53a155bc6.html.
2
See INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, FATAL JOURNEYS: TRACKING LIVES LOST
DURING MIGRATION 11, 22 (Tara Brian & Frank Laczko eds., 2014).
3
See Julia Preston, Illegal Immigrants Number 11.5 Million, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2012, at A14.
4
See Gretchen Gavett, Map: The U.S. Immigration Detention Boom, PBS
(Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/race-multicultural/lost-in-detention/map-the-u-s-immigration-detention-boom/.
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in detention centers, jails, and prisons, in cuffs, shackles, behind
barbed wire, subject to solitary confinement for rule violations.5 In
the face of these circumstances, there is increasing awareness that
the United States’ immigration regulatory regime is “broken” and in
need of thoroughgoing repair.6
Much immigration law scholarship and advocacy in the United
States urges that certain of these problems could be at least partially
redressed by extending to immigrants enhanced judicially enforced
procedural protections, especially a right to counsel. In 1984, the
U.S. Supreme Court held in Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Lopez-Mendoza that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
does not apply in immigration proceedings because, among other
reasons, these proceedings are civil rather than criminal.7 Reversing
I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza would ensure, or so these accounts suggest,
those constitutional protections that would flow from recognizing
immigration proceedings as criminal or quasi-criminal rather than
civil.8 Recognizing immigration proceedings as quasi-criminal
5

See Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration Detention: No Turning Back?, 113
S. ATLANTIC Q. 621 (2014); Alison Mountz et al., Conceptualizing Detention:
Mobility, Containment, Bordering, and Exclusion, PROG. HUM. GEOGR. 1 (2012).
6
See, e.g., Taking Action on Immigration, THE WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration (last visited Sept. 17, 2015)
(“America’s immigration system is broken.”).
7
See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984); Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (noting that because deportation is not punishment, “the provision[]of the constitution . . . prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ha[s] no application”).
8
See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration
Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J.
1563, 1623 (2010) (“The application of the exclusionary rule to removal proceedings is a meritorious proposal to address the procedural problems previously discussed. . . .”); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment:
Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889,
1897, 1935 (2000) (“We should view deportation functionally and treat it as subject to the type of constitutional limitations placed on analogous government control of individual behavior.”) (“It is time to recognize that deportation . . . is punishment. If it must be done, then it must be done with specific, substantive constitutional protections. It should at the very least not be done retroactively, without
counsel, or without a right to bail.”); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the CivilCriminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 350–51 (2008)
(exploring how the protections of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Ex
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could enable not just application of an exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings, but also a right to appointed counsel, among
other protections—revolutionizing constitutional immigration procedure as did the Warren Court revolution in constitutional criminal
procedure.9 In the meantime, advocates have organized outside the
courts to expand access to counsel and other procedural protections
in immigration cases.10
This symposium essay will explore why this focus on procedural
enhancement is woefully incomplete as a vision of immigration justice, even as it serves to protect certain vulnerable individuals. Although a right to counsel, for example, may provide comfort and aid
to certain vulnerable individuals, such procedural protections are
unlikely to change the quasi-criminal character of immigration enforcement or to address the plight of the millions of people without
a path to lawful status. Just as the Warren Court revolution in constitutional criminal procedure failed to ameliorate the harshness of
substantive criminal law, more robust immigration procedural protections would likely fail to reorient immigration enforcement in a
more humane and sustainable direction.
By contrast, this essay will consider an alternative vision of immigration justice associated with a growing movement of immigrant
youth activists who have come out en masse as “undocumented and
unafraid.”11 As these youth activists call for an end to deportations,

Post Facto Clause, the exclusionary rule and other federal evidentiary rules, and
criminal due process venue requirements should be applied in certain immigration
proceedings); Marc L. Miller, Immigration Law: Assessing New Immigration Enforcement Strategies and the Criminalization of Migration, 51 EMORY L.J. 963,
972 (2002).
9
See, e.g., Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for
Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109 (2008); Jonathan L. Hafetz,
The Rule of Egregiousness: INS v. Lopez-Mendoza Reconsidered, 19 WHITTIER
L. REV. 843, 845–46 (1998); Developments in the Law: Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1657 (2013).
10
See, e.g., NEW YORK IMMIGRANT FAMILY UNITY PROJECT, IMPROVING
ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS (2015), http://www.nationalconsortium.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/National%20Consortium/Conferences/2015/Materials/Improving-ATJ-in-Deportation-Proceedings.ashx.
11
See WALTER J. NICHOLLS, THE DREAMERS: HOW THE UNDOCUMENTED
YOUTH MOVEMENT TRANFORMED THE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEBATE 1-7 (2013).
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initiate populist legal mobilizations, and engage in acts of civil disobedience, they gesture towards a broader vision of political and legal reform.12 Through their bold, disruptive actions and discontent
with immigration restrictionism, these youth offer the preliminary
contours of an immigration reform agenda for which procedural protections may serve as a partial means but which is decidedly committed to other ends.13
I. HOPE FOR A REVOLUTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL IMMIGRATION
PROCEDURE?
The litigation that culminated in I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza began
with two separate immigration raids in 1976 and 1977.14 Immigration enforcement officers arrested Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias
Sandoval-Sanchez at their separate places of employment.15 Both
Lopez-Mendoza and Sandoval-Sanchez were placed in deportation
proceedings and both sought to have their proceedings terminated
on the grounds that their arrests violated the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.16
Until 1979, when the Board of Immigration Appeals declined to
apply the exclusionary rule in a separate deportation case, the exclusionary rule was understood to apply in deportation proceedings and
the major treatise in immigration law reported that the exclusionary
rule was available to individuals facing deportation.17 The immigration judges in Sandoval-Sanchez and Lopez-Mendoza’s cases, however, declined to suppress the evidence in question, entered orders
of deportation in both cases, and the Board of Immigration Appeals
affirmed.18
12

See id.; see also Luisa Laura Heredia, Of Radicals and DREAMers: Harnessing Exceptionality to Challenge Immigration Control, 9 ASSOC. MEXICANAMERICAN EDUCATORS (AMAE) 74 (2015); Michael May, Los Infiltradores, THE
AM. PROSPECT (June 21, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/los-infiltradores.
13
See Leti Volpp, Civility and the Undocumented Alien, in CIVILITY,
LEGALITY AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 92–95 (edited by Austin Sarat) (2014).
14
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1035–37.
15
See id.
16
See id.
17
See id. at 1059 (White, J., dissenting) (citing C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.2c at 5–31 (rev. ed. 1980)).
18
See id. at 1035–38.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.19 In reversing Sandoval-Sanchez’s deportation order,
the Ninth Circuit held that his arrest and detention violated the
Fourth Amendment, that his admission of illegal entry was the product of this unconstitutional detention, and that the exclusionary rule
barred its use in a deportation proceeding.20 The court vacated
Lopez-Mendoza’s deportation order and remanded for further review of the alleged Fourth Amendment violations in his case.21
But the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion authored
by Justice O’Connor, reasoned that the civil nature of a deportation
proceeding rendered the various procedural protections that attach
in the context of a criminal trial, including the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule, generally inapplicable: “A deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this
country, not to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or remaining unlawfully in this country is itself a crime.”22 To determine
whether the exclusionary rule applies notwithstanding the civil designation of immigration proceedings, the majority balanced what it
determined to be the minimal deterrent benefit of the exclusionary
rule in this context against the considerable cost of permitting a person to remain in the United States when his continuing presence, in
the majority’s estimation, “constitutes a crime.”23
The majority noted, however, that its “conclusions concerning
the exclusionary rule’s value might change, if there developed good
reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers
were widespread.”24 The majority also left open the remedy of exclusion under the Due Process Clause in the case of “egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress
notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value
of the evidence obtained.”25

19

Lopez-Mendoza v. I.N.S., 705 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 468 U.S.
1032 (1984).
20
Id. at 1063.
21
Id. at 1075.
22
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038.
23
Id. at 1047.
24
Id. at 1050.
25
Id. at 1050–51.
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Justices White, Brennan, Stevens, and Marshall dissented. Justice White, in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan, Stevens, and
Marshall, objected to the majority’s “incorrect assessment of the
costs and benefits of applying the rule in such proceedings . . . .”26
According to Justice White, “INS agents are law enforcement officials whose mission is closely analogous to that of police officers
and because civil deportation proceedings are to INS agents what
criminal trials are to police officers,” the deterrent effect of exclusion in immigration proceedings is likely equivalent to its effect in
criminal proceedings.27 Further, the dissenters discredited the majority’s account that it is a “continuing crime” for a non-citizen to
be present in the United States when he or she entered without authorization, underscoring that the few cases to construe the criminal
unlawful entry statute have held “that a violation takes place at the
time of entry and that the statute does not describe a continuing offense.”28
Justice Brennan put forward an additional basis for dissent in a
separate opinion: that the exclusionary rule is “found in the requirements of the Fourth Amendment itself” and is not only applicable
by virtue of the weight of its deterrent force relative to its costs.29
Justice Marshall likewise emphasized the “constitutionally mandated character of the exclusionary rule”:
[A] sufficient reason for excluding from civil deportation proceedings evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment is that there is no other way
to achieve the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to
avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness
and of assuring the people—all potential victims of
unlawful government conduct—that the government
would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular
trust in government.30
26

Id. at 1052 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1053 (White, J., dissenting).
28
Id. at 1056–57 (White, J., dissenting).
29
See id. at 1051 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
30
Id. at 1060–61 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
27
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Despite the force of the arguments of the dissenters, the LopezMendoza majority opinion has informed immigration procedure for
more than thirty years, limiting the procedural rights available to the
millions of individuals who have been removed from the United
States during this period. In many instances, suppression and termination are the only means to protect a person facing removal from
being returned to a country where he or she may face poverty, violence, separation from his or her family, and other grave personal
harms.
Accordingly, numerous commentators have argued for the reversal of Lopez-Mendoza on two grounds: the first relates to the applicability of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings; the
second concerns the designation of immigration proceedings as
purely civil, thereby curtailing the application of other criminal procedure rights to these proceedings, particularly a right to counsel.31
Though the remedy of suppression remains available in immigration
court under Lopez-Mendoza for “egregious” violations, many cases
are lost due to the absence of more robust procedural protections in
immigration court.32 The more routine availability of the remedy of
suppression—and the recognition of the “close connection” between
31

See, e.g., Elias, supra note 9; Developments in the Law: Immigrant Rights
& Immigration Enforcement, supra note 9, at 1657 (“The status quo is failing.
Lower courts have attempted but largely failed to transform Lopez-Mendoza’s
vague notion of egregiousness into a workable standard consistent with contemporary exclusionary rule doctrine. . . . Most importantly, changes to immigration
enforcement . . . have undermined the decision’s analysis and amplified its distinguishing flaws, in particular its de facto exemption of ICE from meaningful
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. In short, the case for starting over has never been
stronger.”).
32
See Elizabeth A. Rossi, Revisiting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza: Why the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in Deportation Proceedings, 44
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 477, 478, 507–26, 513 (2013) (discussing numerous
cases in which courts have found Fourth Amendment violations insufficiently severe to be classified as egregious, and noting one case in which the Seventh Circuit found the exclusionary rule inapplicable, Gutierrez-Berdin v. Holder,
where—in the course of a suspicionless, warrantless arrest—agents yelled at
Gutierrez-Berdin, handcuffed him, and told him: “Sign the fucking papers. You
don’t have any rights.”). But see Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012,
1017–19 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding it appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule to
suppress evidence in immigration proceedings when the evidence was obtained
during an illegal home raid, where officers entered the home without a warrant,
consent, or exigent circumstances).
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the immigration and criminal processes33—would allow more vulnerable people to avoid deportation or removal, an outcome that
might otherwise be unattainable.34
There are also strong arguments that the factors that animated
the Lopez-Mendoza majority opinion now, three decades later, suggest the continued, even increased, importance of the reintroduction
of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings. There is compelling evidence of widespread Fourth Amendment violations by
INS’ successor agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”), which the majority in Lopez-Mendoza acknowledged explicitly as a circumstance that would support a different result.35 Additionally, immigration and criminal proceedings have become increasingly entwined, rendering perhaps inapt the civil designation
attached to immigration enforcement, or at least altering the balancing of deterrence benefits versus costs relied on by the majority in
Lopez-Mendoza.
Should we hope, then, for a revolution in constitutional immigration procedure analogous to the Warren Court revolution in constitutional criminal procedure? Would expanded procedural protections serve to repair certain of the failings of U.S. immigration law?
Although the application of the exclusionary rule in immigration
proceedings is an amply justified corrective to the harshness and
abuse that often characterizes immigration enforcement, the short
answer is that, whatever its modest advantages, a procedural rights
revolution ought not to constitute the sum total, or even the major
part, of an agenda for immigration justice.
Of course, an expansion of procedural rights in the immigration
context, particularly the right to counsel, would at least partly address the serious needs of a vulnerable group of people for individualized consideration of their cases. But enhanced procedural protections will have limited success in advancing greater immigration
justice, and emphasizing the quasi-criminal nature of immigration
enforcement also poses underappreciated risks and threatens undesired consequences.
33

The United States Supreme Court more recently acknowledged this close
connection between criminal and immigration processes in Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010).
34
See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366.
35
See, e.g., Elias, supra note 9, at 1128–35.
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The expansion of procedural rights would do little to address the
vulnerability of those millions of people without any path to lawful
status in the United States despite long residence, or that of the millions more who are trapped in camps, the hundreds of thousands detained in immigration prisons each year, or those who die trying to
cross the border.36 Even as lawyers may provide some comfort and
aid to those persons in removal proceedings, without more thoroughgoing reform to substantive immigration law, more widespread
legal representation and enhanced procedural protections promise
relatively minimal change.
A further concern with this procedural rights reform agenda is
that this approach may further ingrain the interconnections between
criminal and immigration enforcement. Yet, if expanded procedural
rights are to have the presumably desired effect of mitigating the
harshness of immigration enforcement, resituating immigration law
and policy outside a quasi-criminal framework may be necessary.
But decriminalizing immigration enforcement stands in potential
conflict with an emphasis on the quasi-criminal nature of deportation that animates much of the procedural rights reform agenda.
There are, certainly, other ways to reach the result of expanded
procedural protections in immigration proceedings beyond reversing Lopez-Mendoza’s (and Fong Yue Ting’s37) holdings that immigration enforcement is a civil rather than criminal or quasi-criminal
process. For example, in J.E.F.M. v. Holder, a class of juveniles in
removal proceedings have claimed they are entitled to a lawyer to
represent them at government expense in connection with their immigration cases under, inter alia, the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause. In his order denying the government’s motion to dismiss,
Judge Thomas Zilly of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington recognized:
A fundamental precept of due process is that individuals have a right “to be heard ‘at a meaningful time

36

Some of the analysis in this Part draws from my recent article on criminalimmigration law enforcement. See Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 169
(2012).
37
See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
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and in a meaningful manner’” before “being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even
though it may not involve the stigma and hardships
of a criminal conviction.” . . . . Unlike some other
legal doctrines, due process is “not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances,” but rather is “flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”38 . . The removal proceedings at
issue in this case pit juveniles against the full force
of the federal government . . . . Moreover, courts
have repeatedly recognized “[w]ith only a small degree of hyperbole” that the immigration laws are
“second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.” . . . .39 Although the financial constraints
and border-policing concerns raised by defendants
must play a role in any analysis concerning plaintiffs’
assertion of a right to appointed counsel under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, at this
juncture, they are not sufficiently quantified or developed to allow the Court to engage in the balancing
required . . . .40
Importantly, Judge Zilly noted the critical importance of juvenile
access to counsel in immigration proceedings without likening those
proceedings in any respect to criminal proceedings. 41
38

Order at 6–7, J.E.F.M. v. Holder, No. 14-1026 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13,
2015), ECF No. 114 (internal citations omitted), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/jefm_v_holder_mtd_order_4_13_15.pdf.
39
Order at 30, J.E.F.M. v. Holder, No. 14-1026 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2015),
ECF No. 114 (internal citations omitted), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/jefm_v_holder_mtd_order_4_13_15.pdf.
40
Order at 36, J.E.F.M. v. Holder, No. 14-1026 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2015),
ECF No. 114 (internal citations omitted), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/jefm_v_holder_mtd_order_4_13_15.pdf.
41
Id. at 33 n.26 (“Youth, however, generally correlates with a lack of proficiency in reading and comprehension, even in a native language. For those whose
school-age years were stained by violence, poverty, parental neglect, or similar
hardships, literacy might be an as-yet unachieved goal. . . . [E]ven when juveniles
successfully navigate themselves to removal proceedings, age might still play a
role in increasing their risk of receiving an erroneous ruling.”).
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But beyond the problems associated with characterizing immigration proceedings as quasi-criminal, a separate concern involves
the actual impact of process protections on criminal law administration. Attending closely to the harshness and dysfunction of the U.S.
criminal process—where defendants have access to a full panoply
of constitutional procedural rights, including the benefit of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and the Sixth Amendment
right to appointed counsel—illuminates some of the further potential limits of the proceduralist project as a framework for immigration justice.
Enhanced procedural protections may be confused in this work
for meaningfully transformative substantive ends, in part because of
a general inattention to the outcomes associated with procedural
rights in the criminal context. For instance, the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal cases often offers
minimal protection as the vast majority of criminal defendants plead
guilty in rushed proceedings and the resources and quality of counsel for indigents—disproportionately poor people of color— are frequently deficient. Stephen Bright and Sia Sanneh describe fifty
years of failure to implement a right to effective counsel in criminal
cases in these terms:
Every day in thousands of courtrooms across the nation, from top-tier trial courts that handle felony
cases to municipal courts that serve as cash cows for
their communities, the right to counsel is violated.
Judges conduct hearings in which poor people accused of crimes and poor children charged with acts
of delinquency appear without lawyers. Many plead
guilty without lawyers. Others plead guilty and are
sentenced after learning about plea offers from lawyers they met moments before and will never see
again. Innocent people plead guilty to get out of jail.
Virtually all cases are resolved in this manner in
many courts, particularly municipal and misdemeanor courts, which handle an enormous volume of
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cases. But it is also how many felony cases are resolved.42
Moreover, despite the Eighth Amendment’s protection against
cruel and unusual punishments, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld
even life sentences for relatively minor offenses, for example, for a
nonviolent recidivist offender who sought to pass a forged check in
the amount of $88.30.43 Further, according to one of the leading
Criminal Procedure case books, the exclusionary rule itself is subject to so many exceptions that in fact, “[c]umulatively, the exceptions may be the rule.”44 Yet, as Paul Butler has explained, the right
to counsel in criminal proceedings nonetheless “invests the criminal
justice system with a veneer of impartiality”45
Other potential problems that may be associated with a procedural rights revolution in the immigration context are elucidated by
the work of William J. Stuntz and Charles D. Weisselberg in their
respective studies of the Warren Court revolution in constitutional
criminal procedure. Stuntz has revealed how the combination of robust procedural protections and a political commitment to aggressive crime control coincided with pervasive exceptions to proce-

42
Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance
After Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2152 (2013); see also Stephen B. Bright,
Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836–37 (1994) (describing “the pervasiveness of deficient representation . . . [and] the reasons for it”); David Luban, Are
Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1759 (1993) (“[T]he
Sixth Amendment right is hardly an entitlement to robust advocacy.”); John H.
Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 18 (1978) (“The
modern public prosecutor commands the vast resources of the state for gathering
and generating accusing evidence. We allowed him this power in large part because the criminal trial interposed the safeguard of adjudication against the danger
that he might bring those resources to bear against an innocent citizen—whether
on account of honest error, arbitrariness, or worse. But the plea bargaining system
has largely dissolved that safeguard.”).
43
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978) .
44
See RONALD JAY ALLEN, WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, 2D ED. 449 (2011).
45
See Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights,
122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2178 (2013).
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dural safeguards and with an excessive ratcheting up of the harshness of substantive criminal law.46 This one-way ratchet is a product
in part of legislative and public perceptions that procedural protections interfere with the efficient regulation of crime—a misimpression to which “politicians responded with a forty-year backlash of
overcriminalization and overpunishment.”47
In his study, Mourning Miranda, Charles Weisselberg focuses
on the influence of Miranda v. Arizona’s regime of warnings and
waivers on custodial interrogation practices.48 He finds that Miranda ultimately failed to secure the voluntariness of suspects’ participation in custodial interrogations because the warnings “cohere[]
with a sophisticated psychological approach to police interrogation,
rather than operating apart from it as the Miranda Court intended.”49
Weisselberg laments that Miranda’s prescribed procedures—what
he regards as Miranda’s “hollow ritual”—distract from whether the
values sought to be served by the procedure are actually protected.50
The import of this is not that the Warren Court revolution in constitutional criminal procedure caused the escalating brutality of
criminal law enforcement in the years that followed, or that it is responsible for other forms excesses in U.S. criminal law administration. Nor is it to suggest that a parallel rights revolution in the immigration context would result in increased severity in immigration
enforcement. But just as the revolution in criminal procedure rights
failed to transform the excesses of substantive criminal law, a revolution in immigration procedure would likely fail to reorient immigration enforcement, particularly without a clearly articulated horizon for reform beyond the expansion of procedural protections.
What, then, might serve as meaningful horizon for immigration
reform beyond more expansive procedural protections? And how
might the law act in service of those ends? The bold actions of immigrant youth activists calling for a different form of immigration
46
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justice—as they come out as “undocumented and unafraid,” “work
cases,” and infiltrate immigration detention centers in their “#NotOneMoreDeportation” and “Bring Them Home” campaigns—offer
surprising and compelling alternative conceptions of just immigration reform far beyond mere procedural enhancement, and beyond
the limited path to citizenship and liberalization associated with
comprehensive immigration reform.51
II. DISOBEDIENT DREAMERS
Through wide-ranging civil disobedience, undocumented youth
activists have begun to catalyze a capacious, far-reaching agenda for
immigration justice.52 These youth activists became politicized as
they organized to pass the Development, Relief, and Education for
Alien Minors Act (or DREAM Act) to address their own unauthorized immigration statuses.53 After multiple Congresses failed to pass
immigration legislation, the Dreamers—frustrated with the dysfunction of conventional political and legal processes—began to “work
cases” themselves in their own communities.54 In “working cases,”
the youth activists identified sympathetic individuals facing deportation or removal, produced and distributed videos on the internet,
reached out to the press, coordinated petition drives, and persuaded
legislators and other influential community members to send letters
of support.55 Through this work, the youth spearheaded a form of
populist legal engagement, achieving legal outcomes, such as the
termination of removal proceedings, by laying claim to a higher
form of law—one that recognized, in their words, a human “right to
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remain.”56 As they worked cases, the youth activists themselves increasingly came out as “undocumented and unafraid,”57 and their
work coalesced into a continuing call for “not one more deportation.”58 In the process, the youth built power in their communities—
a core tenet of their advocacy projects—and began to hone their reformist vocabulary, oriented ultimately toward goals beyond immediately achievable immigration reform in Congress, court victories,
or otherwise expanded procedural protections.59
One of the immigrant youth organizers, Mohammad Abdollahi,
has explained how the initial campaigns around individual cases
sparked the idea for detention center infiltrations: “it would literally
work like dominoes. We would do one case, and then we had somebody else contact us.”60 The activists then planned to scale it up to
help a larger group of people by covertly gaining access to the inside
of a detention center and organizing there.61 Inside the detention
center, the youth activists would be able to access new information
and call additional attention to their work.
In their first detention center infiltration in 2013, a group of five
undocumented youth members of the National Immigrant Youth Alliance (NIYA), organized to infiltrate Broward Transitional Center,
a GEO detention facility near Fort Lauderdale, Florida.62 The plan
was to organize the men and women inside and obtain information
from individuals detained there so that the youth activists could
work their cases, identify immigrants eligible for relief, and generate
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media attention to the inhumanity and arbitrariness in immigration
law enforcement.63
The Broward detention facility is gender-segregated, so the organizers arranged for Carlos Saavedra to work with the men following his arrest and for Lulu Martinez to organize the women.64 Mohammed Abdollahi would publicize the cases from outside the detention facility and coordinate the outreach campaign.65 The organizers selected seventy detained individuals and began campaigns
around their cases.66 The activists report that their initial victory
came swiftly, as they won release for a Dreamer who had spent five
months in detention shortly after the youth organizers publicized his
story.67 After just two weeks in detention, Saavedra and Martinez
had met with hundreds of detainees.68 Using the detention facility’s
pay phones, the NIYA organizers began to conduct interviews with
media outlets.69 As soon as the facility became aware of their presence, the organizers were released with a stern warning, but they
continued to advocate in support of their Broward cases.70 The
NIYA activists report that their work contributed to freeing at least
forty detainees, and it garnered national and international attention.71
Rather than merely retracing established narratives associated
with procedural reform, in the criminal context or otherwise, the
youth sought to identify deeply resonant values in American civic
culture that conflict with pervasive immigration enforcement practices.72 By exposing those contradictions, in part by penetrating
sites—like detention centers—that are typically hidden from view,
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the youth introduced to public discourse other reformist strategies
and vocabulary.73
Building on these new strategies and honing their reformist efforts, beginning in July 2013, the “Dream Nine,” leaders in the U.S.
undocumented youth movement also associated with NIYA, crossed
the border to Mexico and turned themselves in at the border alongside other undocumented people who had left voluntarily or had
been removed from the United States.74 Their plan, in initiating this
campaign to “Bring Them Home,” was to demand to be allowed to
return to the United States with applications for humanitarian parole
and other relief in hand—relief for which they may qualify, but
which is not traditionally sought by long-term residents of the
United States or recent deportees.75 The activists publicized their actions through the national and international media, brazenly claiming lawful membership despite their lack of generally recognized
legal status. The youth also linked their membership claims to those
73
See National Immigrant Youth Alliance, Bring Them Home: Lizbeth Mateo
Checking in From Oaxaca, Mexico, YOUTUBE (July 17, 2013),
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18,
2013),
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8/2/13, SOUNDCLOUD (2013), https://soundcloud.com/theniya/maria-isolated.
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Bring Them Home Campaign, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (July 22, 2013,
11:48 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/prerna-lal/why-i-support-the-bringt_b_3628647.html.
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12. Humanitarian parole is a discretionary permission to enter the United States
for urgent humanitarian reasons or for significant public benefit related, for example, to family reunification, medical emergencies, or civil and criminal court
proceedings among other possible grounds. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality
Act § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1882 (d)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5.

574

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:556

of more vulnerable and less sympathetic community members by
demanding entry alongside others differently situated, and forcing
the state’s hand by calling upon purportedly shared values.76
Among the Dream Nine were Lizbeth Mateo, Lulu Martinez,
and Marco Saavedra.77 Lizbeth Mateo was raised in Los Angeles, it
had been fifteen years since she had seen her family in Mexico, and
she was just about to begin her first year of law school at Santa Clara
University School of Law.78 Lulu Martinez immigrated to the
United States at age three, and Saavedra, a graduate of Kenyon College in Ohio and a poet and painter, also immigrated as a child and
worked at his family’s restaurant in New York City.79 All are undocumented and risked being prohibited from entering the United
States, or being criminally prosecuted for immigration-fraud-related
offenses.80 Yet, in the demand to “Bring Them Home,” the Dream
Nine called upon egalitarian and humanist values in U.S. constitutional and civic traditions, and dramatized the interconnection of the
Dream Nine’s fates with those of others vulnerable to deportation,
as well as the more than 1.7 million who have already been removed
from the United States.81
As Prerna Lal, a formerly undocumented youth organizer,
Dreamer, and lawyer, relayed in her essay Why I Support the Bring
Them Home Campaign:
Lulu, Lizbeth and Marco are placing incredibly faith
in our laws, in our sense of justice, and in our ability
to do the right thing for them and the 1.7 million deported by Obama’s deportation regime. If they fail to
make it to the United States, it is not their failure. It
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is our failure to respect, honor and uphold human
life, human rights and dignity . . . .82
One scholarly commentator has characterized similar claims of
unauthorized migrants for inclusion despite their status as “presenting states with an existential dilemma: either treat people as humans
and risk changing who you are (in terms of the composition of your
population), or give up human rights and risk changing who you are
(in terms of your constitutive commitments).”83 NIYA and the
“Bring Them Home” participants present this challenge unequivocally: either admit these young people who are members of the U.S.
polity but for their immigration status, as well as those many others
deported from the United States whose lives and fates are connected,
or risk losing claim to equality, lenity, and meritocracy as core
American values.
The activists’ demands also directly challenge other conceptual
and legal bases of U.S. immigration law enforcement, which generally differentiate “good” from “bad” and “criminal” aliens, primarily along lines of legal status and law-breaking. The “Bring Them
Home” actions upend this logic by insisting on a claim of belonging
despite a lack of legal status, tying that claim of belonging to all of
the more than 1.7 million deported, doing so while engaging in lawbreaking, and invoking a deeper faith in and form of law and justice.84
Critical also to the interventions of the NIYA activists is their
direct challenge to the equation of immigration law-breaking with
criminality—a flawed premise at the core of the Lopez-Mendoza
majority opinion and much regressive immigration law and policy.85
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This challenge unfolds through ongoing protests and in the circulation of graphic art challenging criminal-immigration enforcement.86
Youth activists have sought instead to align immigration lawbreaking with other social movements that have worked to remove
shame from socially subordinated statuses. In publicly claiming the
status “undocumented,” the youth activists seek to confer upon that
identity strength and pride—mobilizing a complicated array of associations, and likening “coming out” of the closet as queer and
proud to fearlessly proclaiming one’s undocumented status or “coming out as undocumented and unafraid.”87
The “Bring Them Home” campaign has effectively enabled additional infiltrations, as certain participants were placed in detention
upon entering the United States.88 Once detained, the Dream Nine
began to organize to address conditions of confinement at Eloy detention center in Arizona—a large detention center administered by
Corrections Corporation of America, a private prison company that
contracts with Immigration and Customs Enforcement.89 Certain of
the youth activists began a hunger strike and were placed in solitary
confinement as a disciplinary measure.90
86

For an example of the graphic art associated with the youth movement, see
Favianna Rodriguez’s piece, entitled “We Can’t Wait. We Won’t Be Criminalized.”
87
See, for example, Khushboo Gulati’s piece, entitled “Undocumented &
Unafraid, Queer & Unashamed.” See also Seif, supra note 57.
88
See President Obama Tortures Dreamers—Six of the DREAM 9 Are Now
In Solitary Confinement, PRERNA LAL: ADVENTURES OF A QUEER INDO-FIJIAN
(July 26, 2013) [hereinafter President Obama Tortures Dreamers],
http://prernalal.com/2013/07/president-obama-tortures-dreamers-six-of-thedream-9-are-now-in-solitary-confinement/; Perla Trevizo, Grijalva, Pastor to
Obama: Let ‘Dream 9’ Stay, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (July 31, 2013, 12:00 AM),
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Lulu Martinez, a member of the Dream Nine detained at Eloy,
faced disciplinary charges and solitary confinement for “prohibited
act #213 – Group Demonstration” after she sought to mobilize
women who had been denied access to phone calls to attorneys, family, and friends.91 Her “Detainee Statement,” submitted as evidence
at her hearing, captures further dimensions of the youth activists’
organizing approach. Martinez wrote the following in her statement
submitted for consideration at her disciplinary hearing, where she
faced a solitary confinement sentence:
Several female inmates including myself have not
been able to make calls to our attorney, family and
friends. All of my calls have been restricted and I
have asked countless times to be instructed on how
to resolve the issue. The detainee handbook supplement indicates we should have been allowed to make
a call within a 24 hr period from the time that we requested assistance. Also several inmates have been
advised/warned/intimidated by CCA staff to not
speak, communicate or interact with myself and
other Charlie inmates. On one occasion detainee Lizbeth Mateo and myself requested to see Ms. Villa
about the issues mentioned above, however, we
never received notice/a reply from her. Overall communication with inmates, staff and family and attorneys outside the facility has been severely limited or
completely restricted. Several inmates and myself
have cooperated and abided by the regulations and
policy to resolve the above mentioned issues/concerns. Today during dinner chow, inmate Maria and
myself announced out loud that we were distributing
a free legal hotline number for the female inmates
who could not afford and did not have legal representation. We also communicated that if they were
being treated unjustly they had to speak up. I know
91

See ELOY DET. CTR., CORR. CORP. OF AM., FINAL IDP HEARING REPORT:
MARTINEZ-VALDEZ, LULU (Aug. 2, 2013) [hereinafter ELOY], http://www.latinorebels.com/2013/08/05/institution-disciplinary-panel-report-dream9-detaineelulu-martinez-valdez/.

578

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:556

that many do not speak or read Spanish and/or English and are never informed about the policy/regulation at this facility and therefore do not document
concerns. In the spirit of love and community Maria
Ines and myself chanted “Sin papeles y sin miedo”
“Las calles son del pueblo, el pueblo donde esta? El
pueblo esta en las calles exiendo libertad”. We were
then escorted out of the eating area and the other female inmates were not allowed to leave. . . .92
Lulu Martinez was sentenced to fifteen days of disciplinary segregation, effectively, solitary confinement.93 In total, six of the
Dream Nine were placed in solitary confinement.94
The actions and protests of the Dream Nine were then publicized
by NIYA organizers outside detention to call media attention, as
well as government officials’ focus, to the plight of non-violent persons—including youth like Martinez—who are placed in solitary
confinement for extended periods in purportedly civil detention for
the purpose of immigration case processing.95Only a few days after
the Dream Nine’s initial confinement, thirty-three Arizona lawmakers wrote to President Obama to express support for those immigrant
youth placed in solitary confinement, recognizing the youth activists
as “victims of our broken immigration policy.”96 Lawmakers urged
that the youth activists “deserve to come home to the United States,”
and praised the Dreamers for taking “this courageous step . . .
fighting to reunite families separated by the border and mass deportation policies . . . .”97
Shortly after, the administration issued new regulations limiting
the use of disciplinary segregation or solitary confinement in immigration detention centers.98 And the Obama administration released
92
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all of the Dream Nine into the United States, indicating, at least for
the time being a choice to adhere publicly to certain constitutive
commitments of an egalitarian and integrationist character.99
The youth activists have made plausible claims that once seemed
implausible.100 By claiming the power to transform immigration law
and policy through raising undocumented voices and visibility, by
enacting those transformed power relationships from within infiltrated immigration detention centers, and claiming rights beyond
those that U.S. law presently contemplates, NIYA’s youth leaders
simultaneously perform and enact their rallying cry—“undocumented and unafraid.”
The youths’ increasingly visible activist engagement has also
coincided with a broader shift in public opinion about the legitimacy
of immigration enforcement and detention practices. A New York
Times editorial published several months later, “End Immigration
Detention,” deems U.S. immigration detention “the most indefensible” part of “all the malfunctioning parts in the country’s brokendown immigration machinery,” noting how it “shatters families and
traumatizes children.”101
Saavedra, a Dreamer and infiltrator, explains NIYA’s civil disobedient tactics as efforts, in his own words, “to subvert hegemonic
relationships . . . through the theater of the oppressed.”102 Saavedra’s
account of NIYA’s immigrant rights advocacy insists that the rights
sought already belong to undocumented people: “We’re human beings. We have a claim to rights because, yes, they rightfully belong
to us.”103 This formulation fundamentally unsettles immigration
law’s existing sovereign restrictionist logic and harsh enforcement
strategies, both by attributing lawfulness and rightfulness to those
elsewhere maligned as law-breakers—inmates in disciplinary segregation or solitary confinement, and those Justice O’Connor in
Lopez-Mendoza deems a criminal class—and by modeling reconfig-
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ured regulatory processes in which impacted persons have a powerful participatory role.104 In all of these settings, NIYA’s civil disobedience claims higher moral and legal legitimacy for its side and
seeks to provoke executive-level and legislative change in line with
its agenda—in a manner reminiscent of a tradition of civil disobedience that runs from Saint Thomas Aquinas to Martin Luther King’s
Letter from Birmingham Jail.
On September 30, 2013, the “Bring Them Home” campaign
continued as the “Dream Thirty” presented themselves at the Laredo
port of entry, sporting caps and gowns, and seeking permission to
enter the United States, while chanting en masse “undocumented
and unafraid.”105 Almost three-dozen people marched across the
U.S.-Mexico border—thirty-four individuals in total, including several minors accompanied by their adult family members.106 As with
the “Dream Nine,” the “Dream Thirty” were initially detained, but
within hours, some of them were released into the United States.107
The “Dream Thirty” action underscored the impossibility of using a large-scale removal program to appropriately sort deserving
from undeserving non-citizens, as U.S. citizen children are effectively removed along with their illegally present parents. One of the
“Dream Thirty” admitted to the United States immediately following the cross-border action is Elsy Nunez, who is a Honduran national and once undocumented resident of the United States, as well
as the mother of a four-year old U.S.-born daughter, Valeria, who
suffers from cerebral palsy and a ruptured eardrum. Despite repeated
attempts to re-enter the country, Nunez had been turned away and
had been unable to access medical care for her daughter. But after
participating in the Dream Thirty action, she obtained entry to the
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United States.108 Also among the Dream Thirty released immediately into the United States were several other parents and children
who traveled together, with the children ranging in age from thirteen
to sixteen.109
The Dream Thirty likewise sought humanitarian parole, a form
of exception to typical immigration procedures granted to address
humanitarian emergencies.110 In addition to claiming humanitarian
emergency, the Dream Nine’s attorney, Margo Cowan, has explained: “For all intents and purposes, they are Americans, except
for on paper”111—again, a fundamental challenge to the categories
and distinctions that ground immigration law enforcement. The activists’ disobedience lies not only in refusing to remain silent and in
provocatively challenging immigration law enforcement, but also in
aggressively using the law against itself. The immigrant youth activists demand to cross the border en masse in ways not contemplated by existing legal frameworks and arguably in violation of existing law. In so doing, the youth activists have forced the law to
bend to their demands (in a more public manner than immigration
adjudication, even with enhanced procedural protections would permit), or lose its claim to legitimacy.
III. RE-IMAGINING IMMIGRATION REFORM
What forms of immigration justice are suggested, then, by these
disobedient Dreamers? In decrying the illegitimacy of deportation—
by insisting that there be “Not One More Deportation”—the youth
activists have staked out a position that re-conceptualizes the immigration debate and places the burden on those who aim to curtail the
human right to freedom of movement.
Although the Dreamers’ claims to a “right to remain” and “freedom of movement” may seem an especially radical reconceptualization of U.S. immigration norms, these youth invoke a deep and
longstanding current in U.S. political discourse—and even in U.S.
constitutional law—that embraces a human right to freedom of
movement. In Kent v. Dulles, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court
108
109
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recognized a tradition in U.S. constitutional law that echoes the
youth activists’ claim. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, declared: “Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values.”112
The Court further noted that the freedom of movement is “deeply
engrained in our history”:
Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our
heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be necessary for a livelihood. It may be as
close to the heart of the individual as the choice of
what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values.113
Moreover, the human right to flee one’s state is widely known
and explicitly adopted in the Declaration on Human Rights, Article
13, as are the moral claims of people for family unity, political expression, and other basic human needs.114 But to recognize those
other fundamental rights, as the youth activists powerfully contend,
requires recognition of a human right and a moral right to move, and
also a moral right for sufficiently just and livable conditions that one
might choose to stay.115
Rather than a call for open borders, the youth activists may be
understood, in their exhortation that there be “not one more deportation,” to invoke an ethic of positive abolition in the immigration
reform context.116 The early twentieth century scholar and activist
112
113
114
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W.E.B. Du Bois understood abolition to be not just a negative project of eliminating the institution of slavery, but also a positive project of building substitutive social democratic forms of coexistence
that would meaningfully displace that unjust and dehumanizing institution.117 According to Du Bois, Reconstruction failed, in significant part, because the abolition of slavery was not accompanied by
the establishment of other egalitarian social and political institutions
and frameworks for democratic coexistence.118 Positive, substitutive
abolition in the immigration context likewise contemplates a constellation of substitutive alternatives to immigration restrictions that
enable a right to freedom of movement, including a right to remain,
and that would tether immigration regulation to economic development and other measures to address human needs rather than restrictionist border enforcement.119
Can we imagine a world in which efforts to regulate immigration
operate by addressing the push and pull factors that drive migration
rather than through a criminal-typed framework of immigration enforcement and a criminal-typed procedurally focused vision of immigration justice? Much of what sustains especially large-scale migration is the capacity to earn more and remit monies home or to
flee violence and insecurity. Targeted programs to shape the push
factors that cause people to move in large numbers, that incentivize
return, and that enable a right to stay would do much to address those
large-scale migrations that are the cause of most concern in receiving states. And they would do so in a way less linked to mass human
concludes: “Slavery was not abolished even after the Thirteenth Amendment.
There were four million freedmen and most of them on the same plantation, doing
the same work that they did before emancipation . . . .” Id. at 169. In response to
the question of how freedom was to “be made a fact,” Du Bois wrote: “It could
be done in only one way. . . . They must have land; they must have education.”
Id. “The abolition of slavery meant not simply abolition of legal ownership of the
slave; it meant the uplift of slaves and their eventual incorporation into the body
civil, politic, and social, of the United States” or positive abolition. See id. at 170;
see also Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA
L. REV. 1156 (2015).
117
See DU BOIS, supra note 115, at 166–70.
118
See id. at 166, 169.
119
See also Linda Bosniak, Arguing for Amnesty, LAW, CULTURE AND THE
HUMANITIES 1, 3–4 (2012) (exploring along different lines an analogy between
efforts to secure immigration justice and abolition).
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suffering than our current multi-billion dollar border fortification efforts, which have operated during a period when millions of people
in fact immigrated to the United States without authorization. Of
course, the question remains: how might we get from a space of pervasive criminalization that is hard even for those committed to reform to imagine beyond to a political space in which immigration
might be addressed through focusing on its underlying causes and
consequences and recognizing the deep human needs migration enables?
CONCLUSION
In responding to the urgent call to repair our failing immigration
laws and policies, the bold disobedience of the Dreamers may not
be replicated by those who study immigration law, administer immigration regulations, serve as legal advocates, or are tasked with
enabling legislative reform. But something of the Dreamers’ impulse toward justice, their courage in re-conceptualizing the terms
of the debate, and their invocation of a higher form of law may already have emboldened those who have sought to humanize U.S.
immigration regulation within and outside the government—and it
ought, in turn, to expand our collective imagination.

